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MAIL-ORDER GUN KITS AND FINGERPRINT-
RESISTANT PISTOLS: WHY WASHINGTON COURTS
SHOULD IMPOSE A DUTY ON GUN MANUFACTURERS
TO MARKET FIREARMS RESPONSIBLY
Amy Edwards
Abstract: Plaintiffs have historically been unsuccessful in suing gun manufacturers for
injuries inflicted by the criminal acts of third parties. Until recently, with one exception,
courts uniformly found no basis for liability under either strict liability or general negligence
claims. In three recent cases, however, courts have imposed a duty under negligent-marketing
theories. These theories have yet to be tested in Washington. This Comment examines the
potential viability of a lawsuit by victims of gun violence against gun manufacturers for
negligent marketing in Washington. It ultimately concludes that Washington courts can and
should impose a duty on gun manufacturers to refrain from marketing their products in a
manner that increases the risk that the guns will be used for criminal activity.
Gun violence filled the headlines in 1999. In Colorado, two students
armed with two shotguns, an assault rifle, and a TEC-9 assault pistol shot
twenty-six people at Columbine High School, killing thirteen.' In Los
Angeles, California, a Washington resident opened fire on people in a
Jewish Community Center using a semi-automatic gun resembling an
Uzi.2 He peppered the building with approximately seventy shots,
injuring five people, including three children? While fleeing the
community center, he shot and killed a postal worker with a 9-mm Glock
26 handgun.4 The shooter obtained both weapons in Washington.5 In
Seattle, Washington, a man walked into a shipyard building at the north
end of Lake Union and shot four people with a handgun, killing two.6
Gun-related violence affects many people in Washington every year.
In 1998 alone, firearms caused 542 deaths7 and 304 injuries. In 1997,
1. See Handgun Control, Private Sales at Gun Shows: Your Friendly Neighborhood Unregulated
Arms Bazaar (visited Jan. 1, 2000) <http'//www.handguncontrol.org/gunshws.htm>.
2. See Suspect in LA. Shootings Surrenders in Las Vegas, Seattle Times, Aug. 11, 1999, at Al.
3. See id
4. See Mike Carter & Keiko Morris, Furrow's Gun Originally a Police Weapon, Seattle Times,
Aug. 13, 1999, at A13.
5. See id
6. See Steve Miletich et al., Gunman Kills 2, Wounds 2 in Seattle, Seattle Times, Nov. 3, 1999, at
Al.
7. See Washington State Department of Health (WSDH), Center for Health Statistics, Death
Certificates (Oct. 1999) (CD-ROM).
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firearms were used in fifty-nine percent of all murders in Washington
and were the most commonly used weapon in aggravated assaults.9
Between 1989 and 1995, Washington hospital charges for gunshot
trauma exceeded $61 million.'
Until recently, almost all cases brought against gun manufacturers in
the United States by victims of gun-related violence failed." Courts
rejected strict- and product-liability claims where guns were not
defective.12 Under negligence claims, courts refused to impose a duty-
a required element in finding liability-on manufacturers to prevent or
decrease the likelihood that their products would be misused. 3
Since 1996, plaintiffs in three cases-two in New York and one in
California-have succeeded in establishing that gun manufacturers owed
them such a duty. 4 In each case, the respective courts applied negligent-
marketing theories and found that gun manufacturers had a duty to
refrain from marketing guns in a manner that increased the risk that the
guns would be used for criminal activity. 5 By imposing such a duty,
courts force manufacturers to address the risks created by their marketing
practices and, ultimately, to be more accountable for the harm their
products caused.16 For example, the threat of prolonged lawsuits against
gun manufacturers by the federal government and various cities has
caused one manufacturer, Smith & Wesson, to adopt measures designed
to decrease gun fatalities, including those caused by criminals. 7 If more
8. See id., Office of Hospital and Patient Data, Comprehensive Hospital Abstract Reporting
System.
9. See Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports for the United States, at 207, 209
(1997).
10. See Washington Ceasefire, Financial Costs of Firearms (visited Oct. 24, 1999)
<http://www.waceasefire.org/waresfinfacts.htm>.
11. See infra Parts II.A and II.B.1.
12. See infra Part II.A.
13. See infra note 98 and accompanying text. Before a gun manufacturer is held liable, plaintiffs
would also need to show breach of duty, causation, and injury. See Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts,
§ 115 at 270-71 (2000).
14. See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 827 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); Halberstam v. S.W.
Daniel, Inc., No. CV 95-3323 (E.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 14, 1995); Merrill v. Navegar, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d
146, 185 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), review granted 991 P.2d 755 (Cal. 2000).
15. See infra Part II.B.2.
16. Because courts typically determine whether a defendant owes a duty to a plaintiff and the jury
determines breach and causation, imposing a duty significantly increases the likelihood that a case
will go to trial. See Dobbs, supra note 13, § 115 at 270-71.
17. See Edward Walsh & David A. Vise, U.S., Gunmaker Strike a Deal, Washington Post, Mar.
18, 2000, at Al.
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courts were to impose a duty on gun manufacturers, similar suits by
private plaintiffs would be more likely to create similar pressures.
This Comment argues that Washington courts should impose a duty
on gun manufacturers to refrain from marketing their guns in a manner
that increases the risk that criminals will use them. Part I discusses the
circumstances in which a defendant can be held liable for the criminal
acts of a third party in Washington and describes the one Washington
case that addressed whether a gun manufacturer is liable for the harm
caused by the criminal acts of a third party. Part II examines cases
brought in other states by victims of gun violence against gun
manufacturers. Part III concludes that Washington law supports
imposing a duty on gun manufacturers to refrain from marketing guns in
a manner that increases the risk that they will be criminally misused.
I. LIABILITY FOR THE CRIMINAL ACTS OF A THIRD PARTY
IN WASHINGTON AND KNOTT v. LIBERTY JEWELRY &
LOAN, 1NC.
Although a person generally has no duty to protect others from the
criminal acts of third parties," Washington courts have recognized a
duty in some circumstances. However, the one Washington case to
address whether a gun manufacturer could be found liable for injuries
caused by the criminal use of its handgun held that the gun manufacturer
had no duty to prevent these injuries.
A. Liability for the Criminal Acts of a Third Party
To prevail in negligence actions, plaintiffs must show that defendants
owed them a duty of reasonable care. 9 Duty is defined as "an
obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform
to a particular standard of conduct toward another."'2 In general, a
person has a duty to act with reasonable care under certain
circumstances. 2' In some cases, however, a defendant may have no duty
18. See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
19. See Dobbs, supra note 13, § 114, at 269; Hutchins v. 1001 Fourth Ave. Assoc., 116 Wash. 2d
217,220, 802 P.2d 1360, 1362 (1991).
20. Transamerica Title Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Wash. 2d 409, 413, 693 P.2d 697, 700 (1985)
(quoting William Prosser, Torts § 53 at 331 (3d ed. 1964)) (internal quotations omitted).
21. See Dobbs, supra note 13, § 115, at 270.
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to act in a particular manner, even when a plaintiff suffers injuries.' For
example, a defendant generally has no duty to protect others from the
criminal acts of third parties.23 Whether a defendant owes a duty of care
is a question of law to be determined by the court24 and "depends on
mixed considerations of logic, common sense, justice, policy, and
precedent."25  Changing social conditions may also lead to the
recognition of new duties.26
There are four exceptions to the general rule that a person has no duty
to protect others from third parties' criminal acts. First, a duty to protect
others from the criminal acts of a third party may arise if a special
relationship exists between a defendant and either a third party or a
victim of the third party's conduct.27 This special relationship is
typically classified by its protective nature and generally involves an
affirmative duty to provide aid.2" For example, it may exist between
school and pupil, innkeeper and guest, or common carrier and
passengers.29 Similarly, courts have found a special relationship between
a defendant and a third party where the relationship is custodial in
nature.30 A defendant, therefore, has a duty to control the third party and
protect others from the third party's "dangerous propensities."'" Courts
have recognized this relationship between employers and employees,
psychiatrists and patients, tavern keepers and intoxicated guests, and
parents and children.32
Second, a special relationship creating a duty to protect others from
the acts of a third party may arise if a defendant "creates or increases the
risk of injury to the plaintiff, or creates a dependent relationship, that
22. See id.
23. See Hutchins, 116 Wash. 2d at 223, 802 P.2d at 1364.
24. See Hansen v. Friend, 118 Wash. 2d 476,479, 824 P.2d 483, 485 (1992).
25. Webstad v. Stortini, 83 Wash. App. 857, 873, 924 P.2d 940, 949 (1996) (quoting Keates v.
City of Vancouver, 73 Wash. App. 257, 265, 869 P.2d 88, 93 (1994)) (internal quotation omitted).
26. See id. at 872, 924 P.2d at 948 (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the
Lmv of Torts § 53, at 359 (5th ed. 1984)).
27. See Hutchins, 116 Wash. 2d at 227, 802 P.2d at 1365-66.
28. See id. at 228, 802 P.2d at 1366.
29. See id. at 227-28, 802 P.2d at 1366.
30. See id. at 228-29, 802 P.2d at 1366 (citing Peterson v. State, 100 Wash. 2d 421,428, 671 P.2d
230, 237 (1983)).
31. Id. at 229, 802 P.2d at 1366.
32. See id.
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induces reliance or prevents assistance from others."'33 The Washington
Court of Appeals addressed this relationship in Webstad v. Stortini
34
when it examined whether the defendant Stortini owed a duty to prevent,
either through words or action, his female companion Webstad from
committing suicide.35 Although Stortini and Webstad had been in a
relationship for more than two years,36 the court held that Stortini's acts
did not create or increase the risk that she would commit suicide, or
prevent her from seeking assistance.37 Thus, it found no special
relationship that would give rise to a duty. 8
Third, in some exceptional circumstances, a duty may arise absent a
special relationship. In adopting the Restatement (Second) of Torts
section 302B, the Supreme Court of Washington in Hutchins v. 1001
Fourth Avenue Associates39 stated that an act or omission may be
negligent if the defendant realized or should have realized that the act
created an unreasonable risk that a third party would harm the plaintiff,
even if such conduct was criminal. Restatement section 302B,
comment (d) explains that generally a defendant may act on the
assumption that others will obey the law.4 However, as comment (e)
explains, in certain situations the defendant may be "required to
anticipate and guard against the intentional misconduct of third
parties."42 One such situation is where the defendant knows of unusual
conditions creating a high risk of intentional misconduct.43 For example,
a railroad company may be liable for running a train with knowledge that
striking employees had wrecked the trains or tracks, and the company
failed to take proper precautions to guard against the employees'
destructive activities.'
33. Webstad v. Stortini, 83 Wash. App. 857, 874,924 P.2d 940,949-50 (1996).
34. 83 Wash. App. 857, 924 P.2d 940 (1996).
35. See id. at 864, 924 P.2d at 944-45. The court treated the suicide as an act committed by a
third party. See id. at 866, 924 P.2d at 945.
36. See id. at 860,924 P.2d at 942.
37. See id, at 876,924 P.2d at 950.
38. See idl
39. 116 Wash.2d217,802P.2d 1360(1991).
40. See iL at 230, 802 P.2d at 1367.
41. See td (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 302B)(1965).
42. ld
43. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 302B cmt. e, subsec. H (1965).
44. See idl, at illus. 15.
945
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Finally, Washington courts have recognized a duty when defendants
negligently entrust chattels45 to third parties they know or have reason to
know are likely to misuse them.46 Such a duty has been imposed on
defendants in the context of entrusting motor vehicles and firearms to
intoxicated persons.47 For example, in Bernethy v. Walt Failor's, Inc.,a"
a representative of the victim's estate sued a retail gun dealer for
wrongful death.49 The plaintiff claimed that the defendant negligently
furnished a gun to an intoxicated person, who then shot and killed the
victim." Relying on the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 390, the
Supreme Court of Washington held that the defendant had a duty not to
furnish a "dangerous instrumentality such as a gun to an incompetent."'"
Additionally, the court cited the Revised Code of Washington (RCW)
section 9.41.080, a criminal statute that prohibits people from delivering
a pistol to someone they have "reasonable cause to believe has been
convicted of a crime of violence, or is a drug addict, an habitual
drunkard, or of unsound mind," as persuasive public policy in support of
its decision.5"
Policy interests also play a role in a court's determination of whether
to recognize a duty to prevent injuries caused by third parties. 3 These
include the "societal interests involved, the severity of the risk, the
burden on defendants, the likelihood of occurrence, and the relationship
between the parties. '54 The Washington Court of Appeals in Lauritzen v.
Lauritzen55 also considered whether the criminal act was foreseeable,
whether defendant would be overly burdened by the duty, whether
45. "Chattel" is defined as "an article of personal property." Black's Law Dictionary 236 (6th ed.
1990)
46. See generally, Bernethy v. Walt Failor's, Inc., 97 Wash. 2d 929, 653 P.2d 280 (1982); Jones
v. Harris, 122 Wash. 69, 210 P. 22 (1922); Mitchell v. Churches, 119 Wash. 547, 206 P. 6 (1922).
47. See Bernethy, 97 Wash. 2d at 934, 653 P.2d at 283; Mitchell, 119 Wash. at 555, 206 P. at 8.
48. 97 Wash. 2d 929, 653 P.2d 280 (1982).
49. See id. at 930, 653 P.2d at 281.
50. See id. at 931,653 P.2d at 281.
51. Bernethy, 97 Wash. 2d at 933, 653 P.2d at 283 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390
(1965)) (internal quotations omitted).
52. Id. at 932-33, 653 P.2d at 282 (quoting statute codified at Wash. Rev. Code § 9.41.080
(1981)) (internal quotations omitted).
53. See, e.g., Webstad v. Stortini, 83 Wash. App. 857, 873, 924 P.2d 940, 949 (1996); Lauritzen
v. Lauritzen, 74 Wash. App. 432, 442, 874 P.2d 861, 867 (1994).
54. Lauritzen, 74 Wash. App. at 442, 874 P.2d at 867.
55. 74 Wash. App. 432, 874 P.2d 861 (1994).
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victims were able to protect themselves from the criminal acts, and
whether defendants received financial benefits from plaintiffs.56
B. Knott v. Liberty Jewelry & Loan, Inc.: Rejecting Liability for a
Gun Manufacturer for the Criminal Acts of a Third Party
In the only Washington case to address a gun manufacturer's liability
for a third party's criminal act, the court of appeals held that the trial
court properly dismissed the case because the gun was not defective and
the distributor and retailer had no duty to exceed the statutory marketing
guidelines for distributing firearms.57 In Knott v. Liberty Jewelry &
Loan, Inc.,"8 Joseph Bates legally purchased a handgun popularly known
as a "Saturday night special," which he used to shoot and severely injure
Douglas Knott." Knott's mother brought claims against the
manufacturer, retailer, and distributor of the handgun under several tort
theories.' She sought to impose liability against the manufacturer under
a product-liability theory alleging that the gun was unreasonably unsafe
by design, and also under a strict-liability theory arguing that the court
should adopt a new common law cause of action for injuries sustained
from the criminal use of handguns that serve no self-defense or sporting
purpose.6 She also sued the retailer and distributor, claiming they were
negligent in distributing and marketing a gun that had no legitimate use
and was often used for criminal activity.62
The court of appeals found that Washington's product-liability statute,
RCW section 7.72.030(l)(a), governed and rejected the plaintiff's
product-liability claim against the gun manufacturer. 3  Section
56. See id. at 442-43, 874 P.2d at 867.
57. See Knott v. Liberty Jewelry & Loan, Inc., 50 Wash. App. 267, 269, 748 P.2d 661, 662
(1988).
58. 50 Wash. App. 267, 748 P.2d 661 (1988).
59. See id. at 269, 748 P.2d at 662. The term "Saturday night special" refers to handguns that are
small, easily concealable, cheaply made, and inexpensive. See Kelley v. ILG. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d
1143, 1153-54 (Md. 1985).
60. See Knott at 269, 748 P.2d at 662.
61. See id at 272, 275, 748 P.2d at 663, 665.
62. See id at 273, 748 P.2d at 664.
63. See id. at 272, 748 P.2d at 663. Subsequent to Knott, section 7.72.030 was amended to
exclude firearms from the general provision holding manufacturers liable where they manufacture
products that are not reasonably safe as designed. Product Liability Act, Ch. 94, § 1, 1988 Wash.
Laws 316-17. The statute now states that firearms "shall not be deemed defective in design on the
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7.72.030(1)(a) states that a "product is not reasonably safe as designed,
if... the likelihood that the product would cause the claimant's
harm... outweighed the burden on the manufacturer to design a product
that would have prevented those harms."'  Because the court found it
difficult to see how any operable handgun would have prevented Knott's
injuries, the statute's requirements could not be satisfied.65
The court also rejected the plaintiff's request to adopt a new strict-
liability common law action as accepted by the Maryland Court of
Appeals.' In Kelley v. R.G. Industries, Inc., 67 the Maryland court held
the manufacturer of a Saturday night special strictly liable for injuries
caused by its criminal use.68 The court in Kelley based its decision on the
fact that the Saturday night special was "too inaccurate, unreliable and
poorly made" to be used by law enforcement, sportsmen, or
homeowners, and the manufacturer knew or should have known that the
gun was principally used for criminal activities. 69 However, the court in
Knott refused to adopt a new rule of law similar to that in Kelley because
in Baughn v. Honda Motor Co.7 the Supreme Court of Washington
rejected a product liability analysis that weighed the risk of harm caused
by a product against its utility.7' In addition, the court stated that the
Washington Legislature was the proper body to establish new causes of
action regarding handguns.72
The Knott court also affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the
plaintiff's negligence action against the distributor and retailer of the
gun.73 Knott argued that because Saturday night specials have no
legitimate purpose and are often used in crimes, the distributor had a
duty to warn retailers of the "dangerous propensities" of the gun and the
basis that the benefits of the product do not outweigh the risk of injury posed by its potential to
cause serious injury or death when discharged." Wash. Rev. Code § 7.72.030(1)(a) (1998).
64. Knott, 50 Wash. App. at 273, 748 P.2d at 663-64 (quoting Wash. Rev. Code § 7.72.030(lXa)
as codified in 1987) (internal quotations omitted).
65. See id. at 273, 748 P.2d at 664.
66. See id. at 275, 748 P.2d at 665.
67. 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985).
68. Id. at 1159.
69. Id. at 1158.
70. 107 Wash. 2d 127, 727 P.2d 655 (1986).
71. See Knott, 50 Wash. App. at 275-76, 748 P.2d at 665 (citing Baughn, 107 Wash. 2d at 147,
727 P.2d at 667).
72. See id. at 276, 748 P.2d at 665.
73. See id. at 273-74, 748 P.2d at 664.
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retailer had a duty to take more precautions than statutorily required to
prevent handgun sales to criminals. 4 The court refused to accept that
argument, finding instead that the Washington Legislature had
"specifically preempted all further regulation of firearms."75 In addition,
the court cited several non-Washington cases that had rejected similar
claims, including an Illinois decision holding that manufacturers had no
common law duty to control the distribution of their firearms to the
general public.76 Although when Knott was decided other jurisdictions
had rejected similar claims," in recent years at least three courts have
accepted them.7"
II. NON-WASHINGTON CASES AGAINST GUN
MANUFACTURERS FOR HARM CAUSED BY CRIMINAL
ACTS OF THIRD PARTIES
Almost all cases brought against gun manufacturers by victims of gun-
related violence have failed.79 Courts have generally rejected strict- and
product-liability claims where the gun was not defective.8" In negligence
actions, most courts have rejected claims that gun manufacturers have a
duty to abstain from selling their products to the general public even
when the manufacturers knew they would be used by criminals.8" Courts
in three recent cases, however, have held that gun manufacturers owed a
74. See id. at 273, 748 P.2d at 664.
75. Id (construing statute codified at Wash. Rev. Code § 9A1.290 (1987)). As amended in 1994,
section 9.41.290 states:
The state of Washington hereby fully occupies and preempts the entire field of firearms
regulation within the boundaries of the state, including the registration, licensing, possession,
purchase, sale, acquisition, transfer, discharge, and transportation of firearms .... Cities, towns,
and counties or other municipalities may enact only those laws and ordinances relating to
firearms that are specifically authorized by state law... and are consistent with this chapter.
Ch. 7, § 428, 1994 Wash. Laws 2242. In the three other cases that have applied section 9.41.290, the
courts addressed whether it preempted a rule or local ordinance. See Cherry v. Municipality of
Metro. Seattle, 116 Wash. 2d 794, 801, 803, 808 P.2d 746, 749-50 (1991); Seattle v. Ballsmider, 71
Wash. App. 159, 164, 856 P.2d 1113, 1116 (1993); State v. Rabon, 45 Wash. App. 832, 835, 727
P.2d 995, 997 (1986).
76. See Knott, 50 Wash. App. at 274, 748 P.2d at 664 (citing Riordan v. International Armament
Corp., 477 N.E.2d 1293, 1295 (Il. App. Ct. 1985)).
77. See inffra Parts ILA and II.B.1.
78. See infra Part ILB.2.
79. See infra Parts H.A and H.B.I.
80. See infra Part H.A.
81. See infra Part H.B.1.
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duty to refrain from marketing their products in a manner that increased
the risk of criminal misuse.
82
A. Strict- or Product-Liability Theories for Gun Manufacturer
Liability
With the exception of Kelley,83 all attempts to hold gun manufacturers
liable for the criminal acts of third parties under strict- or product-
liability theories have failed.84 The plaintiffs in these cases typically
asserted claims using theories of design defect, ultra hazardous or
abnormally dangerous activity, or failure to warn.
Under the design-defect theory, plaintiffs have asserted that particular
guns were defective as designed because they were unreasonably
dangerous, served no useful purpose, or posed risks that outweighed their
utility." Courts, however, have held that gun manufacturers could not be
strictly liable if the plaintiff alleged no actual defect and the gun
functioned as designed.86 Courts have also stated that a risk-utility
analysis, which weighs the risk of harm caused by a product against its
utility, was inapplicable because the function of firearms-rather than a
defect-created the risk of harm. 7
Under the ultra-hazardous or abnormally-dangerous-activity theory,
plaintiffs have argued that gun manufacturers should be liable because
the sale of particular guns was an ultra-hazardous activity.88 However,
courts have held that this doctrine applied only to activities that are in
82. See infra Part ll.B.2.
83. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
84. See Copier v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 138 F.3d 833, 836 (10th Cir. 1998); Perkins v. F.I.E.
Corp. 762 F.2d 1250, 1275 (5th Cir. 1985); Casillas v. Auto-Ordinance Corp., No. C 95-3601 FMS,
1996 WL 276830, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 1996); Delahanty v. Hinckley, 564 A.2d 758, 761 (D.C.
1989); Riordan v. International Armament Corp., 477 N.E.2d 1293, 1297 (III. App. Ct. 1985);
Addison v. Williams, 546 So.2d 220 (La. Ct. App. 1989).
85. See Caveny v. Raven Arms Co., 665 F. Supp. 530, 532 (S.D. Ohio 1987); Riordan, 477
N.E.2d at 1297-98; King v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 451 N.W.2d 874, 875 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990); Forni v.
Ferguson, 648 N.Y.S.2d 73, 74 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
86. See Riordan, 477 N.E.2d at 1298; King, 451 N.W.2d at 875; Forni, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 74.
87. See Perkins, 762 F.2d at 1268-69; Caveny, 665 F. Supp. at 532-33.
88. See Casillas v. Auto-Ordinance Corp., No. C 95-3601 FMS, 1999 WL 276830, at *4 (N.D.
Cal. May 17, 1996); Delahanty, 564 A.2d at 760; Riordan, 477 N.E.2d at 1297; Resteiner v. Sturm,
Ruger & Co., 566 N.W.2d 53, 56 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
950
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themselves inherently dangerous.89 The use of a gun-not the selling of
it-was the ultra-hazardous activity.9"
Finally, courts rejected claims that gun manufacturers had a duty to
warn consumers about the hazards of firearms. Plaintiffs argued that
manufacturers should be strictly liable for failure to warn consumers
about the criminal misuse of guns.9" Courts have held that because the
general public understood the inherent dangers of firearms,
manufacturers had no duty to warn.92
B. Negligence Theories for Gun Manufacturer Liability
With three exceptions,93 plaintiffs have been unsuccessful in arguing
that gun manufacturers should be held liable under various negligence
theories.' In most cases, courts have found that manufacturers had no
duty to refrain from selling or distributing their firearms even when
manufacturers knew that criminals used them.95 In three recent cases,
however, courts imposed a duty on manufacturers to refrain from
marketing their products in a manner that increased the risk that they
would be used for criminal activities.96 In these cases, the duty arose not
from merely selling firearms to the general public, as had been argued in
earlier cases, but from the manner in which manufacturers chose to
market their firearms.97
89. See Delahanty, 564 A.2d at 761; see also Copier v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 138 F.3d 833, 836
(10th Cir. 1998); Casillas, 1996 WL 276830, at *4; Riordan, 477 N.E.2d at 1297.
90. See Copier, 138 F.3d at 836; Casillas, 1999 WL 276830, at *4; Riordan, 477 N.E.2d at 1297.
91. See Delahanty, 564 A.2d at 760; Resteiner, 566 N.W.2d at 56.
92. See Delahanty, 564 A.2d at 760; Resteiner, 566 N.W.2d at 56.
93. See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); Halberstam v. S.W. Daniel,
Inc., No. CV 95-3323 (E.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 14, 1995); Merrill v. Navegar, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1999), review granted, 991 P.2d 755 (Cal. 2000).
94. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
95. See infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
96. See infra notes 110-15 and accompanying text.
97. See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 824; Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 163; Halberstam, No. CV
95-3323, Mem. of Law in Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss Second Am. Compl., at 15-16
[hereinafter Pis.' Second Mem.].
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1. Cases Where Courts Refused to Impose a Duty on Gun
Manufacturers
In cases where courts did not impose a duty on gun manufacturers,
plaintiffs typically alleged that gun manufacturers were negligent in
selling specific types of guns to the public when the manufacturers knew
or should have known of the high risk that the guns would be used for
criminal activities.98 Plaintiffs argued that manufacturers were negligent
in either selling guns to the general public" or in the manner in which
guns were distributed."°° For example, in First Commercial Trust Co. v.
Lorcin Engineering, Inc.,' l the plaintiff claimed that the defendant was
negligent in promoting its handgun in a market it knew or should have
known included persons likely to "misuse the handgun by injuring or
killing others."'0 2 In Riordan v. International Armament Corp.,' 3 the
plaintiffs argued that the manufacturer had a duty to take reasonable
precautions in selling its products to prevent sale to criminals."'°
Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the manufacturer failed to
oversee retailers to ensure that they were taking proper measures to
screen prospective buyers and that manufacturers had a duty to terminate
business with retailers who had a history of selling firearms to
criminals."5
Courts evaluating such claims generally refused to recognize that gun
manufacturers had any duty to protect plaintiffs from intervening
criminal acts of third parties absent a special relationship, like that
98. See Casillas v. Auto-Ordinance Corp., No. C 95-3601 FMS, 1996 WL 276830, at *2 (N.D.
Cal. May 16, 1996); Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 771, 775 (D.N.M. 1987); First
Commercial Trust Co. v. Lorcin Eng'g, Inc., 900 S.W.2d 202, 203 (Ark. 1995); Delahanty v.
Hinckley, 564 A.2d 758, 759 (D.C. 1989); Riordan v. International Armament Corp., 477 N.E.2d
1293, 1295 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); Resteiner v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 566 N.W.2d 53, 55 (Mich. Ct
App. 1997); Forni v. Ferguson, 648 N.Y.S.2d 73,74 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
99. See Casillas, 1996 WL 276830, at *2 (asserting that defendant should be liable for
manufacturing and selling weapons associated with criminal activity); First Commercial Trust, 900
S.W.2d at 203; Resteiner, 566 N.W.2d at 55.
100. See Riordan, 477 N.E.2d at 1295; Linton v. Smith & Wesson, 469 N.E.2d 339, 340 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1984); Forni, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 74.
101. 900 S.W.2d 202 (Ark. 1995).
102. Id. at 203.
103. 477 N.E.2d 1293 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
104. See id. at 1295.
105. See id.
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between an innkeeper and guest.10 6 In other cases, courts held that gun
manufacturers had no duty to control distribution of firearms because
distribution was intended for members of the general public, who can
recognize the dangerous consequences of using handguns.'0 7
2. Cases in Which Courts Imposed a Duty on Gun Manufacturers
under Negligent-Marketing Theories
Courts in three cases have held that gun manufacturers owed plaintiffs
a duty of care in the manner in which they marketed their guns."' The
courts found that the duty arose not from merely selling specific types of
firearms to the general public but from the manner in which
manufacturers chose to market, advertise, and distribute their products."°9
Although all three cases advanced negligent-marketing claims, the cases
relied on slightly different theories. In Hamilton v. Accu-Tek," ° the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of New York held that
manufacturers of inherently dangerous products like handguns had a duty
to oversee the distribution of their guns to decrease the likelihood that the
guns would end up in the hands of criminals."' In Halberstam v. S. W.
Daniel, Inc., the plaintiffs asserted that the defendant had a duty based
on the negligent-entrustment doctrine: through its marketing techniques,
the defendant had acted negligently in entrusting its product to a person
likely to use it for criminal activity."' In Merrill v. Navegar,"4 the
California Court of Appeal held that the defendant had a duty not to
106. See Casillas v. Auto-Ordinance Corp., No. C 95-3601 FMS, 1996 WL 276830, at *3 (N.D.
Cal. May 17, 1996); First Commercial Trust, 900 S.W.2d at 205; Delahanty v. Hinckley, 564 A.2d
758,762 (D.C. 1989).
107. See Riordan, 477 N.E.2d at 1295; see also Linton v. Smith & Wesson, 469 N.E.2d 339, 340
(Ill. App. Ct. 1984); Fomi v. Ferguson, 648 N.Y.S.2d 73, 74 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
108. See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); Halberstam v. S.W. Daniel,
Inc., No. CV 95-3323 (E.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 14, 1995); Merrill v. Navegar, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1999), review granted 991 P.2d 755 (Cal. 2000).
109. See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 824-25; Halberstam, No. CV 95-3323, Mem. of Devorah
and David Halberstam and Nachum Sosonkin in Opp'n to the Mots. to Dismiss by S.W. Daniel et
al., at 5 [hereinafter Pis.' First Mem.]; Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 152, 185.
110. 62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
111. Seeid at825.
112. No. CV 95-3323 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
113. See infra note 154 and accompanying text.
114. 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), review granted, 991 P.2d 755 (Cal. 2000).
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market its product in a way that substantially increased the risk of
criminal misuse. s
a. Hamilton v. Accu-Tek: Negligent Distribution of Firearms
In Hamilton, the district court held that the manufacturers had a duty
to take reasonable steps at the point of distribution to reduce the
possibility that their firearms would fall into the hands of criminals." 6
The plaintiffs, relatives of seven people killed or injured by handguns in
and around New York City, sued twenty-five handgun manufacturers for
negligence." 7 The guns used had been obtained illegally and with one
exception, the manufacturers were unknown."' The plaintiffs claimed
that the manufacturers should be liable because their indiscriminate
marketing and distribution practices generated an underground market in
handguns, which provided criminals access to these weapons." 9
Specifically, the plaintiffs asserted that the defendants had a duty to
exercise reasonable care in marketing and distributing handguns to guard
against criminal misuse. 2 °
The duty imposed by the court came from two intersecting theories:
(1) liability for acts of a third party; and (2) duties of manufacturers to
design, produce, and market non-defective products.' 2' The court held
that a duty to minimize the risks of a criminal act by a third party might
be imposed where a special relationship existed between defendants and
plaintiffs. 2 2 This special relationship obligated defendants to take
reasonable steps to protect plaintiffs from foreseeable risks including the
criminal acts of third parties.'23 The court articulated three justifications
for finding a special relationship. 24 First, the manufacturers' special
ability to detect and guard against the risks associated with their firearms
and the foreseeability that these guns would injure plaintiffs created a
115. See id. at 185.
116. See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 825, 827 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
117. See id. at 808.
118. See id. at 808-10.
119. See id. at 808.
120. See id. at 824.
121. Seeid. at 819.
122. See id. at 820.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 821-22.
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protective relationship between the manufacturers and the plaintiffs."2
Second, the manufacturers' relationship with distributors and retailers
provided them with the authority and ability to control the conduct of the
distributors and retailers.126 Thus, manufacturers could be regarded as
negligently entrusting their products when they did business with
distributors who sold firearms in a manner that posed a great risk to the
public.' 7 Finally, the court found that a special relationship may be
created when manufacturers affirmatively enhance the risk of injury.'28
The court stated that manufacturers owed a broad duty to consumers
to design, produce, and market products that were reasonably safe for
their intended use. 29 Liability could attach anywhere along the line of
production including manufacturing, advertising, and distribution of the
product. 3 The court held that the duty imposed was consistent with the
expansive view of duty established in previous New York cases dealing
with other types of products.'
The court rejected gun manufacturers' concerns that they could have
done little to reduce the risk that their firearms would be sold to
criminals and thus prevent the ensuing harm.'32 The court cited statistics
from the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) that
confirmed the rapid movement of guns from legal markets to illegal
ones.' The court noted that the two most common methods of moving
legal guns into the illegal market involve: (1) the use of "straw
purchasers" who legally purchase firearms and then sell them to
ineligible persons, and (2) falsification of ATF firearm transaction
records at the time of purchase.'34 The court found that the relationship
between manufacturers, distributors, and retailers gave the manufacturers
considerable control over the ultimate use of their products. 35 It
reasoned that the defendants could reduce the risk of criminals obtaining
125. See i at 821.
126. See ia.
127. See id.
128. See id at 822.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 823.
131. Seeid. at 824.
132. See id. at 820.
133. See id at 825-26.
134. See id. at 826.
135. See id.
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and misusing firearms by declining to do business with "careless or
unscrupulous" federal firearm licensees, limiting sales at unregulated
gun shows, and requiring public sales of handguns to occur in
responsibly operated stores.'3 6 The court held that "manufacturers of a
uniquely hazardous product, designed to kill and wound human beings,"
had a duty to take reasonable steps at the point of primary distribution to
reduce the possibility that firearms would fall into the hands of those
likely to misuse them.'37
The court distinguished this theory of liability from previous
negligence cases that sought to impose liability for marketing a
dangerous product. 3 In those cases, the plaintiffs' negligence claims
were just an alternative pleading of their strict product liability claims.'39
Therefore, the plaintiffs essentially sought to impose liability merely for
selling these weapons to the general public.'" The theory in Hamilton
instead imposed liability based on the nature of the marketing techniques
employed by the manufacturers. 4 ' The court found that the
manufacturers' method of sale and distribution could be tortious even if
the actual sale of the weapon was not. 42
The court also articulated several public-policy reasons supporting its
decision. It found that manufacturers were well-positioned to reduce the
rapid rate of diversion from legal retail markets to underground criminal
markets, and that imposing a duty would be an appropriate cost-
spreading mechanism. ' The court found that "between a negligent
handgun manufacturer and an injured bystander, the former must be
regarded as the cheapest cost avoider,-[sic] the party on whom the
imposition of liability will lead to the greatest degree of safety and
efficiency."'" Furthermore, the court stated that recognizing a duty
would not necessarily impose crushing liability on the industry. "' The
court concluded that legal and policy arguments adequately supported
136. Id. at 826.
137. Id. at 825.
138. See id. at 824.
139. See id. at 825.
140. See id.
141. See id. at 824.
142. See id. at 825.
143. See id. at 826.
144. Id. at 827 (internal citations omitted).
145. See id.
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the imposition of a duty on the defendants to use reasonable care in
marketing and distributing their firearms.'46
b. Halberstam v. S.W. Daniel, Inc.: Negligent Entrustment of
Firearms Through the Manufacturer's Marketing Techniques
In Halberstam v. S. W. Daniel, Inc.,47 the plaintiffs based their case
on the doctrine of negligent entrustment: the defendant had acted
negligently by entrusting its product to a person likely to use it for
criminal activity.' The plaintiffs asserted that the manufacturer owed a
duty to the general public to adopt reasonable restraints on the marketing
of its product.'4 9 The court denied defendant's motions to dismiss.Y5
The plaintiffs sued the manufacturer of a Cobray M-1 1/9 after Rashid
Baz used it to shoot at a van of children, killing Aaron Halberstam and
injuring Nachum Sosonkin."' The Cobray was assembled from parts the
defendant manufactured and marketed through mail-order assembly
kits. 52 The defendant asserted that Baz had purchased the Cobray "on
the streets.' ' 3
The plaintiffs based their negligent-entrustment claim on the
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 390, which states that a person
who provides a dangerous instrumentality to someone likely to misuse it
may be liable for any harm caused by that partyY 4 In an effort to
include the defendant's activities under this doctrine, the plaintiffs relied
on Restatement section 302B, which states that "[a]n act or omission
may be negligent if the actor realizes or should realize that it involves an
unreasonable risk of harm to another through the conduct of... a third
146. See id
147. No. CV 95-3323 (E.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 14, 1995). Because the court did not issue any written
opinions, the information in this section comes from court documents and briefs, and Timothy D.
Lytton, Halberstam v. Daniel and the Uncertain Future of Negligent Marketing Claims Against
Firearms Manufacturers, 64 Brook. L. Rev. 681 (1998).
148. See Lytton, supra note 147, at 688.
149. See id at 682, 687.
150. See Halberstam, No. CV 95-3323 Civil Docket at 6, 12, and 23.
151. See Lytton, supra note 147, at 686.
152. See No. CV 95-3323, Pis.' Second Am. Compl. at 11-13.
153. See Pis.' Second Mem., supra note 97, at 37 n.24.
154. See Lytton, supra note 147, at 688 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390)(1965).
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person which is intended to cause harm, even though such conduct is
criminal.' 55
Furthermore, the plaintiffs argued that the defendant's advertising
campaign and distribution techniques specifically targeted a group of
people likely to engage in criminal activity. Advertisements of the
Cobray promoted it as "'The Gun that Made the 80's[sic] Roar"' and
boasted of "the controversial Drug Lord choice of Cobray firearms."'56
Because the defendant sold the Cobray as an assembly kit not subject to
normal firearm sales and licensing regulations that require a serial
number, the plaintiffs argued that the defendant's sales procedures were
designed to allow criminal purchasers to avoid federal and state
restrictions on firearms possession.'57 Therefore, the intended purchaser
of the product fell into a group that a reasonable person would consider
lacking in ordinary prudence.'58
The plaintiffs successfully countered the defendant's argument that a
duty could not be imposed on a manufacturer to protect against the
criminal acts of a third party absent a special custodial relationship.'59
The plaintiffs asserted that the duty arose from specific acts by the
defendant that created or increased the risk of criminal misuse of its
firearms."6 The plaintiffs argued that a special relationship is necessary
only in cases of nonfeasance, where the defendant fails to intervene to
prevent a third party from harming a victim, not in cases of misfeasance,
where the defendant's conduct creates or increases the risk that a third
party will harm a victim.'6 ' The court denied the defendant's second
motion to dismiss based on these arguments.'62 Although the case went
to trial, the jury found the defendant not liable.'63
155. Lytton, supra note 147, at 688-89 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 302B (1965))
(internal quotations omitted).
156. No. CV 95-3323, Pis.' Second Am. Compl. at exh. C, exh. I.
157. See id. at 11-13, exh. C.
158. See No. CV 95-3323, Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6)
[hereinafter Def.'s First Mot. to Dismiss] at 21; Pis.' First Mem. at 8.
159. See Pis.' First Mem., supra note 109, at 37.
160. See id. at 5.
161. Id. at 36-37 (citing Carrini v. Supermarkets Gen. Corp., 550 N.Y.S.2d 710 (N.Y. App. Div.
1990)).
162. See Halberstam, No. CV 95-3323, Civil Docket at 6, 12, and 23.
163. See Lytton, supra note 147, at 697-98.
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c. Merrill v. Navegar: Marketing Techniques that Increase the Risk of
CriminalMisuse
In Merrill, the California Court of Appeal held that the defendant had
a duty to refrain from marketing its firearms in a manner that
substantially increased the risk of harm caused by those firearms." 4 The
plaintiffs sued Navegar, the manufacturer of the semiautomatic assault
weapons (TEC-9 and TEC-DC9' 6s) used by Luigi Ferri to kill eight
people and injure six others at a San Francisco law firm. 66 Ferri had
purchased one TEC-DC9 from a gun show and another from a store in
Las Vegas, Nevada.67
The plaintiffs alleged that Navegar was negligent or strictly liable or
both for these injuries and deaths because of the manner in which it
marketed the TEC-DC9. 6  To support their claim, the plaintiffs
presented evidence that the TEC-DC9 was an extraordinarily dangerous
weapon that was completely useless for hunting, recreational or
competitive shooting, and self-defense. 69 The TEC-DC9 was also one
of the most commonly used guns in criminal activity.7 In 1990 and
1991, it was the leading assault weapon seized by law enforcement in
large cities. 7' Furthermore, plaintiffs asserted that the manufacturer had
exploited the TEC-DC9's popularity with criminals by advertising
specific features that served no lawful purpose.72 For example,
promotional materials emphasized the. TEC-DC9's resistance to
fingerprints. 7 Other design features of interest to criminals included its
combat sling; its threaded barrel that permitted the attachment of a
silencer, flash suppresser, or barrel extension; its size, which allowed it
164. See Merrill v. Navegar, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146, 185 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), review granted 991
P.2d 755 (Cal. 2000).
165. The TEC-DC9 is a modification of the TEC-9 which may have been intended to "evade a
ban on the TEC-9" in Washington, D.C. Id. at 152 n.3. Hereinafter, both the TEC-9 and the TEC-
DC9 will be referred to as TEC-DC9.
166. See id. at 152.
167. See &L at 152-53.
168. See id, at 152.
169. Seeid. at 154.
170. See id. at 155.
171. See id Assault weapons like the TEC-DC9 accounted for 10% of the guns traced to crimes
in 1988-89, but represented merely 0.5% of the privately owned firearms in the United States during
the same time. See id
172. See id at 156-57.
173. See id
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to be transported with relative ease and concealability compared to other
guns with similar firepower; and its compatibility with the "Hell Fire"
trigger system, which permitted it to be "fired at full automatic rate-
300 to 500 rounds per minute."'1
74
The court of appeal reversed the trial court's grant of summary
judgment for the defendant on the negligence claim.'75 The court stated
that the plaintiffs' assertions that Navegar breached its duty to refrain
from advertising the TEC-DC9 to the general public must be read
together with the allegations regarding Navegar's knowledge of the
TEC-DC9's extraordinary risk of misuse. 76 The court held that the
defendant owed "a duty to exercise reasonable care not to create risks
above and beyond those inherent in the presence of firearms in our
society.' 77 The court analogized this duty to the one owed under
assumption-of-risk and comparative-fault doctrines associated with
inherently dangerous activities such as sports. 7 8  In this context,
defendants typically have no duty to eliminate or protect plaintiffs
against risks inherent in the activity, but defendants do have a duty to
exercise reasonable care not to increase the risks to plaintiffs over and
above those inherent in the activity. 179 Similarly, the court stated that
gun manufacturers should refrain from increasing the inherent dangers of
firearms by marketing them in a manner appealing to criminals. 80
Although the court recognized that liability for increasing the risk of
harm to a third party generally requires a special relationship, lack of a
special relationship was not necessarily a bar to imposing a duty in this
case where the risk was increased by Navegar's affirmative act of
marketing the TEC-DC9 in a manner appealing to criminals, not by its
failure to act.' Furthermore, a defendant's intentional misfeasance,
coupled with a high degree of foreseeable harm, may eliminate the need
for a special relationship. 82 For example, the defendant's promotion of
174. See id. at 154, 156-57.
175. See id. at 152.
176. See id. at 163.
177. Id. at 152.
178. See id. at 163.
179. See id. at 163-64.
180. See id. at 164.
181. See id. at 164-65.
182. See id. at 164.
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certain features of the TEC-DC9 may be seen as increasing the inherent
risk posed by the gun. '3
Several factors justified the court's departure from the general rule
against imposing liability for the criminal acts of a third party."M The
court found that the criminal use of the TEC-DC9 was foreseeable.
18 5
According to the court, the record provided sufficient evidence to prove
that Navegar was aware of the significant criminal use of the TEC-DC9
and the lack of any legitimate use."86 The fact that Ferri's actions were
criminal was irrelevant to whether the act was foreseeable.8 7 Because
the deaths and injuries resulting from gun violence place enormous social
and economic costs on society, the court found that preventing these
consequences was an important public-policy objective.' The court
determined that imposing liability on gun manufacturers who make
particularly lethal weapons with little legitimate civilian use"9 and who
market these weapons to persons likely to misuse them ' would not
unreasonably burden the defendant or adversely affect the community.' 9'
The court also stated that gun manufacturers should not receive more
protection from negligence liability than manufacturers of other more
socially useful products. 92
183. See ia at 165; supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
184. See Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 165 (referencing factors articulated in Rowland v. Christian,
443 P.2d 561,564 (Cal. 1968)).
185. See i& at 165-66.
186. Seeid. at 166.
187. See i
188. See iaL at 169-170.
189. See id at 171. To support its conclusion that the TEC-DC9 had little legitimate civilian use,
the court referred to the fact that both the California Legislature and U.S. Congress banned the TEC-
DC9. The California Assault Weapons Control Act states that the TEC-DC9 has "such a high rate of
fire and capacity for firepower that its function as a legitimate sports or recreational firearm is
substantially outweighed by the danger that it can be used to kill and injure human beings." Cal.
Penal Code § 12275.5 (West 1989). Similarly, in passing the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, Congress considered evidence that assault rifles such as the TEC-DC9
were "the weapons of choice among drug dealers, criminal gangs, hate groups, and mentally
deranged persons bent on mass murder." H.R. No. 103-489, 2d. Sess., at 13 (1994).
190. See Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 171.
191. See 1i at 172. In comparison, the court cited Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co., 936 P.2d 70,
81-82 (Cal. 1997), where the court refused to impose a duty on a garbage truck operator to guard
against frightening horses because it would unreasonably burden those who operate garbage trucks,
which are a socially useful machine. See Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 170.
192. Seeid at 172.
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The court also found that the defendant's marketing strategy for TEC-
DC9s was morally blameworthy. 93 For example, Michael Solodovnick,
Navegar's national sales and marketing director from 1989 to 1993,
admitted knowing that people were attracted to TEC-DC9s because the
guns could be used with the "Hell Fire" trigger system. 94 In 1991, he
pled guilty to violating federal gun laws by acting in furtherance of a
conspiracy that included transferring manuals and videotapes relating to
the conversion of TEC-DC9s into fully automatic firearms. 95 He also
stated that the condemnation of the TEC-DC9 generated sales and that
"'whenever anything negative has happened, sales have gone
tremendously high." ' 196  Furthermore, Carlos Garcia, president of
Navegar until 1995, admitted that certain accessories of the TEC-DC9,
such as flash suppressors, would be of no interest to law-abiding citizens
because those accessories would suggest 'a criminal purpose."
97
The court also rejected the defendant's contention that the California
Assault Weapons Control Act (AWCA) 9 8 and section 1714.4(a) of the
California Civil Code prevented imposing a duty on manufacturers.' 99
The court stated that the AWCA and other laws applicable to the
manufacture and sale of firearms do not necessarily define the scope of
the duty or standard of care applicable to gun manufacturers or
retailers.2" It found that the AWCA does not exempt manufacturers
from a duty to refrain from marketing their products negligently, even if
that duty would impose responsibilities exceeding those required by the
AWCA or other gun control laws.2"'
The court also stated that California Civil Code section 1714.4(a) only
applies in cases involving a defective product claim.20 2 Section
1714.4(a) states: "In a products liability action, no firearm or
ammunition shall be deemed defective in design on the basis that the
benefits of the product do not outweigh the risk of injury posed by its
193. See id. at 169.
194. See id. at 157.
195. See id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 158.
198. Cal. Penal Code § 12275 (West 1989).
199. See Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 173.
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. See id. at 175-76.
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potential to cause serious injury, damage, or death when discharged.""2 3
The purpose of section 1714.4(a) was to deal with product-liability
actions involving an allegedly defective product.2' The court cited the
legislative history of the bill as support for this determination 25 and
concluded that section 1714.4(a) was not applicable to the
manufacturing, marketing, and sale of non-defective firearms.20 6
Finally, the court rejected the defendant's argument that imposing a
duty would create an impermissible judicial ban on the manufacture and
sale of firearms like the TEC-DC9.2 7 The court explained that the
purpose of making an act tortious was to force manufacturers to absorb
the cost of injuries caused by their products. 20 ' By imposing a duty, the
court, therefore, did not intend to ban the sales of the TEC-DC9. 209
III. WASHINGTON COURTS SHOULD IMPOSE A DUTY OF
CARE ON GUN MANUFACTURERS UNDER A NEGLIGENT-
MARKETING THEORY
Washington courts should impose a duty on gun manufacturers to
refrain from marketing their products in a manner that increases the risk
that criminals will use their guns. Washington case law supports the
imposition of such a duty under a general negligent-marketing theory or
one related to the negligent-entrustment doctrine. Public-policy factors
also support imposing a duty on manufacturers because they are well-
positioned to decrease the criminal use of firearms and imposing a duty
would not be unreasonably burdensome.
A. Current Washington Law Supports the Imposition of a Duty on Gun
Manufacturers
Washington courts should impose a duty on gun manufacturers to take
reasonable steps to alleviate the use of their firearms by criminals. A
203. Id at 175 (quoting Cal. Civ. Code § 1714.4(a)) (internal quotations omitted).
204. See id. at 176.
205. See id. The original bill would have precluded negligence actions as well as product-liability
actions; however, it was amended to remove the negligence language. See id. (discussing Sen.
Judiciary Comm. Rep. on Assem. Bill. 75 (1983-1984 Reg. Sess.)).
206. See id.
207. See id. at 178.
208. See id. at 179.
209. See id at 178.
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duty should arise when gun manufacturers market guns, either through
advertising or distribution methods, in a manner that increases the risk
that the guns will be used for criminal activity. Courts should also
impose a duty when the manufacturer, through its advertising and
distribution methods, negligently entrusts its products to people likely to
misuse them. Because the theories rejected in Knott v. Liberty Jewelry
and Loan, Inc. are distinguishable from these negligent-marketing
theories, Knott would not preclude imposing such a duty. Finally,
imposing a duty would not create an impermissible judicial ban on
firearm sales.
Washington law supports the imposition of a duty on gun
manufacturers to refrain from marketing their products in a manner that
increases the risk that the guns will be used for criminal activities. A
Washington court recognized a similar duty in Webstad v. Stortini, where
the court evaluated whether the defendant had a duty to prevent the
plaintiff from committing suicide.21 Although any firearm has the
potential to cause harm, courts should find that gun manufacturers who
advertise or distribute their firearms in ways that increase the risk that
criminals will misuse them have increased the likelihood that plaintiffs
will be harmed by criminal activity. Thus, manufacturers' marketing
techniques could create special relationships that give rise to a duty.
The three out-of-state cases addressing negligent-marketing claims
also lend support to imposing a duty upon gun manufacturers in
Washington. This type of duty was articulated in Merrill v. Navegar,'
relied on in Halberstam v. S. W. Daniel, Inc.,2 and recognized in
Hamilton v. Accu-Tek.2 3
The Restatement (Second) of Torts section 302B, which the Supreme
Court of Washington accepted in Hutchins v. 1001 Fourth Avenue
Associates, provides additional support for imposing a duty when gun
manufacturers market their firearms in a manner increasing the risk of
criminal misuse. 4 Section 302B imposes liability when parties act in
ways they realize or should realize create an unreasonable risk of harm to
210. 83 Wash. App. 857, 859-60, 924 P.2d 940, 942 (1996); see supra notes 33-38 and
accompanying text.
211. See 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146, 163-165 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), review granted, 991 P.2d 755 (Cal.
2000).
212. See PIs.' First Mem., supra note 109, at 5, 36-37.
213. See 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 822 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
214. See 116 Wash. 2d 217, 230, 802 P.2d 1360, 1367 (1991).
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another through the conduct of a third party."5 For example,
manufacturers who know their firearms are being distributed in a way
that increases the likelihood of criminal use are just as culpable as the
railroad company in the Restatement's illustration, which ran a train
knowing that striking employees had wrecked the tracks." 6
The theory articulated in Halberstam, the mail-order gun case, may
provide another avenue for victims of gun violence in Washington.
Under this theory, a person who provides a chattel to a party likely to use
it to harm another person may be held liable.2" 7 Furthermore, RCW
section 9.41.080 prohibits a person from delivering a firearm to anyone
believed ineligible to possess one, including people convicted of felonies
or other serious offenses.2" 8 Washington courts have accepted the
negligent-entrustment doctrine where the defendant was the retailer,2" 9
and the courts should expand it to include manufacturers as well. When
gun manufacturers target their advertising in a manner appealing to
criminals, they necessarily increase the likelihood that their products
will, in fact, be sold to criminals. For example, in Halberstam, the
defendant designed the Cobray assembly kits so that they were not
subject to normal firearm regulations, including restrictions on
distribution." Thus, the kits were attractive to people who could not
otherwise obtain firearms legally." By selling firearms in such a
manner, the intended purchasers fall within a group of people likely to
engage in criminal activity.'
The greater problem that plaintiffs may face in bringing negligent-
marketing actions against gun manufacturers will be determining which
acts by manufacturers increase the risk of criminal activity. The courts
have not articulated clear rules for making this determination, but recent
decisions suggest some general guidelines. The mere act of
manufacturing and selling dangerous firearms would be insufficient to
215. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 302B (1965).
216. See supra note 39-44 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
218. See Wash. Rev. Code § 9.41.080 (1998) (referencing Wash. Rev. Code § 9.41.040 (1998)).
219. See Bernathy v. Walt Failor's, Inc., 97 Wash. 2d 929, 930, 653 P.2d 280, 281 (1982).
220. See Halberstam v. S.W. Daniel, Inc., No. CV 95-3323 (E.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 14, 1995), Pls.'
Second Am. Compl., at 11-13 exh. C.
221. Seeid, at3.
222. See Lytton, supra note 147, at 692.
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establish a duty.223  In cases where plaintiffs relied on arguments
regarding the inherent dangers of firearms and did not address specific
acts by manufacturers in marketing them, courts have refused to
recognize a duty.224 In contrast, in cases where courts did find a duty,
they referenced specific acts taken by manufacturers, which were found
to actually increase the risk that firearms would be misused.2  For
example, the court in Merrill pointed to specific design aspects of the
TEC-DC9 highlighted by the manufacturer's marketing techniques.226
Similarly, the Hamilton court relied on information regarding the rapid
rate at which the manufacturers' handguns moved from legal markets to
illegal ones (the "time to crime" rate).2
In determining whether to impose a duty, courts should also consider
the type of gun used by the criminal third party in conjunction with the
marketing technique employed by the manufacturer; where the gun is
more likely to be used by criminals and has little or no social value, a
court should be more likely to impose a duty on the manufacturer. 228 For
example, the court in Merrill implied that Navegar's marketing
techniques229 made the TEC-DC920 more appealing to criminals. In
contrast, a manufacturer would be less likely to advertise a gun having a
legitimate social purpose, like a hunting rifle, in a manner appealing to
criminals because a hunting rifle would not necessarily have features that
criminals desire.
Although the Washington Court of Appeals in Knott v. Liberty
Jewelry & Loan, Inc. refused to impose liability against a gun
manufacturer, distributor, and retailer for injuries caused by the criminal
acts of a third party,23" ' the case does not preclude a negligent-marketing
claim. Because the negligent-marketing theory focuses on marketing
techniques employed by the manufacturer and not on the design of the
223. See Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146, 163 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), review granted,
991 P.2d 755 (Cal. 2000); Lytton, supra note 147, at 684, 690.
224. See supra Part II.B.1.
225. See supra notes 137, 189-91 and accompanying text.
226. See Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 171-72.
227. See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 826 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
228. See supra notes 176 & 189 and accompanying text.
229. See id. at 171.
230. See Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 155.
231. See Knott v. Liberty Jewelry & Loan, Inc., 50 Wash. App. 267, 277, 748 P.2d 661, 666
(1988).
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gun itself, 2 the holding in Knott, that a non-defective handgun cannot
give rise to a design defect claim, is inapplicable. Similarly, the pertinent
Washington statute governing product liability 3 would not preempt a
negligent-marketing claim that is not based on an alleged design defect.
Moreover, in dealing with a California statute similar to Washington's,
the court in Merrill found that the statute was not applicable to negligent-
marketing claims.u 4
The Knott court's rejection of the plaintiff's request to establish a new
common law tort does not forbid imposing a duty on gun manufacturers
under negligent-marketing theories. Because Washington courts have
already recognized a defendant's duty to refrain from increasing the risk
of harm to a plaintiff caused by the criminal or tortious acts of a third
party, a court would not have to recognize a new tort to impose a duty
in these situations. Therefore, the Knott court's concerns about
recognizing a new common law cause of action 6 would not be
implicated by imposing a duty on gun manufacturers who market their
products in a manner that increases the risk the guns will be misused.
Furthermore, neither of the rationales used by the Knott court to reject
the negligent-marketing claims against the retailer and distributor of the
handgun should prevent Washington courts from imposing a duty on
manufacturers to refrain from distributing their firearms so as to increase
the risk they will be used by criminals. The first rationale used by the
court to reject the negligent-marketing claim-that the state of
Washington had preempted the entire field of firearm regulation under
RCW section 9.41.290"- is not supported by case law or legislative
history. With the exception of Knott, courts have applied RCW section
9.41.290 only when addressing whether it preempted a local ordinance or
rule, not common law negligenceus For example, in Seattle v.
Ballsmider,"9 the appellate court examined whether section 9.41.290
preempted a local ordinance that imposed a greater sentence for
232. See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 824 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
233. See Wash. Rev. Code § 7.72.030(1)(a) (1998).
234. See Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 175-76.
235. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
236. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
237. See Knott v. Liberty Jewelry & Loan, Inc., 50 Wash. App. 267, 273-74, 748 P.2d 661, 664
(1988).
238. See supra note 75.
239. 71 Wash. App. 159, 856 P.2d 1113 (1993).
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discharging a firearm than the state statute allowed.24 In Cherry v.
Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle,24  the Supreme Court of
Washington specifically rejected a claim that the preemption statute
could apply to something other than a local law or ordinance.242
Furthermore, nothing indicates that the legislature intended to preempt
common law negligence claims against manufacturers, distributors, or
retailers through section 9.41.290. As originally enacted, 243 the statute's
purpose was to provide uniform firearm laws to remedy the problems
associated with varying local laws and ordinances making gun
possession and use more restrictive in certain parts of the state.2
Because section 9.41.290 was intended to preempt only local laws or
ordinances, it should not be interpreted as preempting common law
negligence claims.
The Knott court's reliance on non-Washington cases as its second
rationale for rejecting the plaintiff's negligent-marketing claim245 is not
persuasive in light of a more recent growing acceptance of such claims in
other jurisdictions. Unlike the cases referenced in Knott,246 more recent
cases, relying on new statistical information regarding the movement of
firearms into illegal markets, have recognized the ability of gun
manufacturers to alleviate gun violence.247
Finally, imposing a duty on gun manufacturers under negligent-
marketing theories would not create an impermissible judicial ban on the
sale of particular firearms. The duty sought to be imposed does not seek
to prevent firearm sales to the general public but only to require that
manufacturers market their products responsibly. Because the purpose of
240. See id. at 161-62, 856 P.2d at 1116.
241. 116 Wash. 2d 794, 808 P.2d 746 (1991).
242. See id. at 803, 808 P.2d at 749.
243. See Washington Uniform Firearms Act, Ch. 232, § 12, 1983 Wash. Laws 1200.
244. See Senate Judiciary Comm., Section Analysis of Substitute Senate Bill No. 3782, 1983
Legis. Sess. (Wash.); Final Legislative Bill Report on Substitute Senate Bill 3782 (1983) (noting
local jurisdictions may only have laws consistent with state laws); see also 1985 Wash. Laws ch. 428
§ 85 (amending Wash. Rev. Code § 9.41.290) Final Legislative Report on Substitute Senate Bill No.
3450.
245. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
246. See Knott v. Liberty Jewelry and Loan, Inc., 50 Wash. App. 267, 274-75, 748 P.2d 661,
664-65 (1988).
247. See infra notes 268-73 and accompanying text.
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tort liability is to require defendants to absorb the cost of harm caused by
their products, this new duty would not create a regulatory prohibition.24
B. Gun Manufacturers' Ability to Alleviate Gun Violence Without
Undue Burden Supports the Imposition of a Duty
Public-policy factors-including the burden on a defendant to prevent
harm, financial benefits received by a defendant, and the foreseeability
of the criminal activity249-- support imposing a duty on gun
manufacturers for the criminal acts of third parties because they are well-
positioned to decrease the use of their products by criminals.
Furthermore, Washington courts have acknowledged that changing social
conditions often lead to the recognition of new duties.2"
Imposing a duty on gun manufacturers when they increase the risk of
their products being used for criminal activities would not create an
unreasonable burden. Imposition of a duty would only require that
manufacturers refrain from marketing their products in a manner that
increases their risk of being misused. In Hamilton, the plaintiffs
presented evidence that gun manufacturers could adopt non-negligent but
economically feasible distribution practices."1 In addition, recent studies
have shown that a small number of federal firearm licensees are
responsible for selling most of the guns used in crime. 2 The ATF
reported that 1.2% of current federal firearm licensees accounted for
57% of the guns used in crimes that were traced back to active dealers. 3
Because so few retailers are responsible for selling a majority of guns
used in crimes, if manufacturers refrain from selling their firearms to
these retailers their overall sales would likely not be greatly impacted.
To the extent that gun manufacturers choose to market their products
in a manner that increases the risk that the guns will be used for criminal
activity, it is not unreasonable to shift the cost of gun violence back to
248. See Merrill v. Navegar, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146, 178-79 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), review granted,
991 P.2d 755 (Cal. 2000).
249. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
250. See Webstad v. Stortini, 83 Wash. App. 857, 872, 924 P.2d 940, 948 (1996) (citing Strode v.
Gleason, 9 Wash. App. 13, 17, 510 P.2d 250, 252 (1973)).
251. See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 827 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
252. See Department of Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, & Firearms, Commerce in
Firearms in the United States, at 23 (Feb. 2000) [hereinafter Commerce in Firearms].
253. See id.
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the industry.25 4 Although victims of gun violence do not necessarily
provide gun manufacturers with a direct financial benefit, gun
manufacturers do profit from the criminal use of firearms. In 1997, the
Census of Manufacturers estimated the total product shipments of
firearms in the United States at $1.2 billion and ammunitions sales at an
additional $859 million.255 Retail sales of firearms for 1995 were
estimated at $9 billion.256 One gun manufacturer alone, Sturm, Ruger &
Company, earned $209.4 million in 1997.257 In contrast to the profits
made by gun manufacturers, the cost of gun violence is bome by victims
and, through tax dollars, by the population in general. Between 1989 and
1995, the total hospital costs for gunshot trauma in Washington were
more than $61 million.25 8 Nationally, the costs of treating gunshot
injuries is estimated at $4.5 billion per year.259 The costs of gun violence
are continuing to escalate and one authority estimates that by 2003 gun
violence will surpass automobile accidents as the leading cause of death
and injury in the United States.260 However, unlike automobile drivers
who are almost always insured, four out of five gunshot victims are on
public assistance or uninsured. 6' By not imposing a duty on gun
manufacturers, courts allow them to profit from injuries caused by gun
violence.
The use of firearms by criminals is not only foreseeable but actually
known by most gun manufacturers. Robert Hass, a former senior vice-
president of marketing and sales for Smith & Wesson, has acknowledged
the gun industry's awareness of the criminal misuse of firearms and the
black market created by the movement of firearms from unsupervised
federal firearms licensees.262 The court in Hamilton found that a 1994
promotional pamphlet issued by the Sporting Arms and Ammunition
254. See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 827.
255. See Commerce in Firearms, supra note 252, at 8.
256. See Tom Diaz, Making a Killing: The Business of Guns in America 7 (1999).
257. See id. at 85.
258. See supra note 10.
259. See Susan Headden, Guns, Money and Medicine, U.S. News and World Report, July 1, 1996,
at 30.
260. See id.
261. See id.
262. See City of Chicago v. Beretta, No. 98 CH 015596 (Ill. Cir. Ct., Apr. 6, 1999), First Am.
Compl., at 61 (quoting Robert Hass, former senior vice-president for Smith & Wesson).
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Manufacturers Institute263  supports the inference that the industry is
aware of the illegal market and that retailers, unsupervised and
uncontrolled by manufacturers, are a significant source of these
handguns.2" Furthermore, when ATF traces guns used in crimes back to
their origin, they effectively notify manufacturers of the criminal use of
their products. 265 For example, ATF traced the AR-15 semi-automatic
assault rifle taken from Buford Furrow, the man who opened fire at a
Jewish community center in Los Angeles, back to its manufacturer
within days of the shooting.2" In some instances, gun manufacturers
have even acknowledged that the criminal use of their products boosted
sales.267
Finally, there is a growing recognition of gun manufacturers' ability to
reduce illegal gun trafficking. The Hamilton court found that
manufacturers were well-positioned to reduce the flow of illegal guns by
declining to do business with "careless or unscrupulous" federal firearms
licensees, limiting sales at unregulated gun shows, and requiring the
initial public sale of any handgun to take place only in responsibly
operated stores.268 The Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) has threatened to sue gun manufacturers on behalf of public
housing residents across the United States for the costs of firearm
violence to those communities.26 9 One of the concessions sought by
HUD in the threatened suit is to require manufacturers to supply guns
only to licensed dealers who agree to take additional precautions to
decrease sales to "straw purchasers." '27 Finally, the gun industry has
263. See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 830 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). The Sporting Arms
and Ammunition Manufacturers Institute is a trade association to which most of the U.S. handgun
manufacturers belong. See id.
264. See id. The pamphlet discusses membership support for adopting measures designed to
prevent criminals from obtaining guns including imposing penalties against dealers who sell to
unqualified persons or straw purchasers. See id.
265. See Fox Butterfield, Gun Flow to Criminals Laid to Tiny Fraction of Dealers, N.Y. Times,
July 1, 1999, at A14.
266. See Steve Berry, Assault Rifle Used in Shooting Traced to Gun Maker in Maine, Seattle
Times, Aug.12, 1999, at A22.
267. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
268. See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 826 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
269. See Chitra Ragavan, The U.S. Targets Gun Makers, U.S. News and World Rep., Dec. 20,
1999, at 26.
270. See Walsh & Vice, supra note 17, at Al. Smith & Wesson recently decided to adopt a
number of measures designed to decrease gun fatalities including only supplying its handguns to
licensed dealers who agree to a more stringent screening process of prospective buyers. See id.
Smith & Wesson also agreed to refrain from advertising guns as "fingerprint proof." See Susan
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expressed an awareness of the movement of firearms into criminal
markets through thousands of unsupervised federal firearms licensees;
however, none of the principal U.S. manufacturers have made any
additional efforts to investigate, screen, or supervise distributors or
retailers to ensure that firearms are distributed responsibly."'
Recent studies finding that a significant number of crime guns were
originally purchased from federal firearms licensees and then rapidly
moved into illegal markets support the conclusion that gun
manufacturers are well-positioned to control retailers who sell to straw
purchasers or criminals. One such study found that 140 gun stores
throughout the United States were responsible for a disproportionate
number of guns sold to purchasers without criminal records but that were
later used in crimes.272 Of the 35,000 guns traced back to these 140
stores over the past three years, eighty-seven percent were found in
possession of someone other than the original buyer. 73
IV. CONCLUSION
The tragedy of gun violence is well-known. Every year it directly
impacts hundreds of people in Washington and indirectly affects
thousands more. Common law duties have proven to be an effective way
of recognizing the need for various segments of society to take
responsibility for the harm they cause. Washington courts should impose
a duty on gun manufacturers to refrain from marketing their products in a
manner that increases the risk that they will be used by criminals. Public-
policy concerns support the conclusion that gun manufacturers are well-
positioned to reduce the appeal of certain types of firearms to criminals
and to lessen the flow of firearms into illegal markets. Gun
manufacturers must become part of the community in which they sell
their products and take responsibility for their actions. Imposing such a
duty would force them to address these issues and ultimately change
their behavior.
Milligan, New Safety Precautions Taken by Top Gun Maker, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Mar. 18,
2000, at Al.
271. See City of Chicago v. Beretta, No. 98 CH 015596 (Ill. Cir. Ct., Apr. 6, 1999), First Am.
Compl., at 61 (quoting Robert Hass, former senior vice-president for Smith & Wesson).
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